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We consider an economy that has to decide how assets are to be used.
Agents have ideas, but these ideas conﬂict. We suppose that decision-
making authority is determined by hierarchy: each asset has a chain
of command, and the most senior person with an idea exercises au-
thority. We analyze the optimal hierarchical structure given that some
agents coordinate and other specialize. Among other things, our the-
ory explains why coordinators should typically be senior to specialists
and why pyramidal hierarchies may be optimal. Our theoryalsothrows
light on the optimal degree of decentralization inside a ﬁrm and on
ﬁrm boundaries.
We would like to acknowledge the very helpful suggestions of Philippe Aghion, Carliss
Baldwin, Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Bob Gibbons, Louis Kaplow, Julio Rotemberg, Andrea
Prat, Ilya Segal, editors Steve Levitt and Canice Prendergast, and an anonymous referee
and the research assistance of Ulrike Malmendier. We have also beneﬁted from comments
from Abhijit Banerjee, Patrick Bolton, Rebecca Henderson, Arthur Hosios, Bentley
MacLeod, Fausto Panunzi, David Parkes, Rohan Pitchford, Andrew Postlewaite, Michael
Schwarz, Andrei Shleifer, Jean Tirole, Birger Wernerfelt, and Chenggang Xu and from
the reactions of seminar audiences at the Western Economic Association and European
Association for Research in Industrial Economics meetings. We acknowledge ﬁnancial
support from the U.S. National Science Foundation through the National Bureau of
Economic Research and from the U.K. Economic and Social Research Council.676 journal of political economy
I. Introduction
Suppose that a decision must be made in an organization. The orga-
nization might represent a private ﬁrm, a public ﬁrm, or even society.
Assume that individual i favors one decision and individual j favors
another. Who gets his or her way? In many cases, the answer is that this
depends on who is senior in the organization. That is, there is a hierarchy
of individuals with respect to any decision. In the event of a conﬂict,
the decision will be made by the most senior person in the hierarchy
who cares about—or has a view about—this particular decision.
In this paper we develop a model of hierarchies. We consider an
economy that has to decide how assets are to be used. Agents may have
ideas about asset usage, but these ideas conﬂict; that is, only one person’s
idea can be implemented with respect to any one asset. We suppose
that each asset has a chain of command, and the most senior person
in the chain who has an idea—who needs access to the asset—imple-
ments her idea. The order in which ideas are proposed does not matter
(“top down” and “bottom up” both lead to the same outcome) given
that a senior person is willing to defer to her juniors if she does not
have an idea herself.
We use our model to analyze the optimal hierarchical structure given
that different agents have different tasks; in particular, some agents are
engaged in coordination and others in specialization. Among other
things, our theory explains why coordinators should typically be senior
to specialists and why pyramidal hierarchies may be optimal. Our theory
also throws light on the optimal degree of decentralization inside a ﬁrm
and on the boundaries of the ﬁrm.
Before proceeding, we should acknowledge that the assumption that
decisions are made hierarchically is hardly uncontroversial. For exam-
ple, the Coase theorem suggests that the parties should bargain about
which decision is made and divide up the surplus in some appropriate
manner. Alternatively, the right to have access to an asset could be
auctioned off or decisions could be determined by voting. In this paper
we put the Coase theorem, auction mechanisms, and voting to one side
and assume that decisions are made hierarchically. However, we offer
some justiﬁcations for this assumption. We describe some conditions
under which a hierarchy may be the only feasible organizational struc-
ture. Also, we show that under some conditions a hierarchy achieves
ﬁrst-best, in which case other organizational forms do not have to be
considered.
To give a ﬂavor of the analysis, consider the case of two assets, and a1
. One agent specializes in thinking of ideas about how to use ; aa 2 1
another agent specializes on . A third agent coordinates the two assets: a 2
she thinks of ideas about how the assets may be used in tandem. Thedesign of hierarchies 677
question is, if the coordinator’s ideas conﬂict with those of the spe-
cialists, whose idea should take priority?
The most natural hierarchy has the coordinator senior on both assets.
In this case, if the coordinator has an idea, she will implement it, whether
or not the specialists have ideas, since she has authority. In contrast,
each specialist will implement his idea only if (a) he has one and (b)
the coordinator does not.
Interestingly, this structure is not always best. It may be dominated
by another hierarchy in which the coordinator is junior to the specialist
on each asset. In this case, each specialist will implement an idea when-
ever he has one, whereas the coordinator will implement her idea only
if (a) she has one and (b) neither specialist does. (If either specialist
implements his idea, this preempts the use of one of the assets, which
means that the coordinator cannot implement her idea, given that she
needs to use the assets in tandem.) Under what circumstances can we
rule out these less natural hierarchies?
One of our main propositions makes use of a fairly plausible mono-
tonicity condition, that an agent’s probability of having an idea decreases
with her span of control. Assuming that this condition holds, we prove
that agents with a broad remit, that is, whose tasks cover a large subset
of assets, should appear higher in the chain of command than those
with a narrow remit. We interpret agents with a broad remit to be
strategic planners, who contemplate future directions for the organi-
zation. So our result says that big thinkers should be senior to small
thinkers: coordinators should be senior to specialists. The intuition for
this result is the following. A coordinator, who has an idea comparatively
rarely, appears at all in an organization only because she has the po-
tential to generate large value. But to do so, she must have control over
all the assets that she needs. In other words, she must be senior: she
must not be blocked on some key asset by a specialist.
We also establish that “crisscross” hierarchies are never optimal; that
is, if individual i appears above individual j on one asset, j will not appear
above i on another asset. The reason for this is that if i is senior to j
on one asset and j is senior to i on another, then i and j will block each
other if both of them have an idea.
Under an additional assumption that synergies are nested, we can go
further and show that the optimal hierarchy is a pyramid, in the sense
that if an agent has a boss on one asset, he has the same boss on every
asset he works on.
Our model throws light on the trade-off between centralization and
decentralization, as well as on the boundaries of the ﬁrm. The terms
“centralization” and “decentralization” are often employed in the lit-
erature, but their meaning is sometimes not very clear. We deﬁne an
organization to be centralized if it is likely that a decision will be made678 journal of political economy
by someone at headquarters (a coordinator) rather than by someone
with local expertise (a specialist). We deﬁne an organization to be de-
centralized if a decision is likely to be made by a specialist rather than
by a coordinator. One advantage of our approach is that centralization,
decentralization, and independent ﬁrms are points on a continuum and
the trade-off between them can be analyzed in a single model. We show
that, if the gains to coordination are large, it is optimal for the orga-
nization to be centralized; if the gains to coordination are moderate, it
is optimal for the organization to be decentralized (in a class of cases);
and ﬁnally, if the gains to coordination are small, then it is optimal for
the organization to split up into several independent ﬁrms (indepen-
dent ﬁrms correspond to the case in which two assets have different
people at the top of their chains of command, i.e., different owners).
On a very different tack, we think that our analysis may relate to the
design of computer operating systems. When multiple central processor
units (CPUs) operate in parallel and programs need the use of more
than one processor at a time, instantaneous ranking decisions must be
made to adjudicate the competing demands of different programs.
Should a program that simultaneously needs several CPUs have priority
over a group of programs that need only one CPU each? This is akin
to our question of whether a coordinator should be senior to a group
of specialists: the use of a CPU is analogous to access to an asset. The
analogy is not exact, not least because our model of hierarchies is static
(if one individual has access to an asset, then all other individuals are
precluded from that asset), whereas a computer operating system is
dynamic (running one program on a CPU merely delays another pro-
gram from being run on that CPU).
1 There is one sense in which the
design of a hierarchy for a computer operating system may be a simpler
problem than ours, though: CPUs are generic (a program can typically
run on any subset of the CPUs), whereas in our model an asset is speciﬁc
to the agents whose tasks use it. For more on the design of hierarchies
in parallel-processing computer systems, see Tanenbaum (2001, 521–
26).
There is a vast literature on many of the issues we consider, and this
is not the place to provide a review. Economists have studied hierarchical
structure from the following points of view: productivity enhancement
and span of control (see, e.g., Williamson 1967), optimal monitoring
(see, e.g., Calvo and Wellisz 1979), task assignment with or without
coordination (see, e.g., Rosen 1982; Harris and Raviv 2002), information
processing and team theory (see, e.g., Keren and Levhari 1979; Radner
1992; Bolton and Dewatripont 1994; Van Zandt 1999), management by
1 For a discussion of mechanisms such as hierarchy for allocating a scarce resource in
a dynamic context, see Lando (2004).design of hierarchies 679
exception (see, e.g., Garicano 2000), and optimal statistical decision
making (see, e.g., Sah and Stiglitz 1986). By and large, however, with
the exception of papers by Aghion and Tirole (1997), Baker, Gibbons,
and Murphy (1999), and Rajan and Zingales (2001), discussed further
below, the existing literature does not analyze hierarchy in terms of
authority; that is, it is not the case that if individual i is above individual
j in the hierarchy, i necessarily has authority over j. Rather, in much of
the literature, if i is above j in the hierarchy, then j provides information
to i. Also, the literature does not distinguish between what happens
inside a ﬁrm and what happens between ﬁrms.
The papers by Aghion and Tirole (1997), Baker et al. (1999), and
Rajan and Zingales (2001) do study hierarchical structure in terms of
authority (or power). Aghion and Tirole study a two-person hierarchy
in which one person is the boss and the other the subordinate. Each
can have an idea. The boss’s idea is implemented if she has one, whereas
the subordinate’s idea is implemented if he has one but the boss does
not. Our paper is close in spirit to Aghion and Tirole’s; the main dif-
ferences are that they emphasize the ex ante incentive to have ideas
rather than ex post efﬁciency, and they do not consider multiperson
hierarchies. Baker et al. consider a repeated version of Aghion and
Tirole and study how the boss may develop a reputation for imple-
menting the subordinate’s ideas even when, from a short-term per-
spective, she might prefer to implement her own. Finally, Rajan and
Zingales consider a model in which the hierarchical structure deter-
mines who interacts with whom. The idea is that under a large, steep
hierarchy the boss is insulated from many of the ﬁrm’s workers and
knows little about them, which gives the boss’s close subordinates con-
siderable bargaining power. The opposite is true for ﬂat hierarchies.
Rajan and Zingales draw various conclusions about optimal organiza-
tional form in physical capital versus human capital industries.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present the model.
Sections III and IV show how the model works in the case of two agents
and three agents, respectively. Section V contains general results for the
m-asset, n-agent case. In Section VI we analyze the trade-off between
centralization and decentralization. Section VII provides some inter-
pretation of the model and discusses certain foundational issues. Finally,
Section VIII presents conclusions.
II. The Model
We consider a two-date economy consisting of m assets, a1,… ,am, and
n risk-neutral agents 1, …, n. Each asset represents a decision that has
to be made ex post, at date 1. These decisions are noncontractible both
ex ante and ex post. However, a hierarchy of authority over decisions,680 journal of political economy
an organizational form, can be contractually speciﬁed ex ante, at date
0.
Agents are assigned tasks at date 0. A task consists of thinking about
what to do with a particular subset of the m assets, that is, what decisions
to make with respect to these assets at date 1. For each subset A O
, there is a corresponding task .
2 More than one person {a ,… ,a } t(A) 1 m
can be assigned the same task.
A task may or may not reach fruition at date 1 in that with some t(A)
probability the agent carrying out the task can generate 0 ! p(A) ! 1
value (as long as he or she has access to all the assets in A), v(A) ≥ 0
but with probability , no value can be generated.
3 We refer to 1  p(A)
the event in which value can be generated as “the agent has an idea.”
We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. All ideas are stochastically independent events.
If two or more people are assigned the same task , then each, t(A)
independently, has a probability of having an idea. p(A)
We put no restrictions on the valuation function . It may not be v( 7)
superadditive or even nondecreasing in A. We have in mind a situation
in which thinking about how to use two assets is a very different activity
from thinking about how to use one of them. The ﬁrst activity involves
coordination whereas the second does not. If coordination possibilities
are limited, then the value of having an idea about how to coordinate
two assets may be very low, or even zero. If a coordinator is to succeed
in generating any value at date 1, we assume that he must have access
to—have decision-making power over—all the assets in his remit.
Assumption 2. An agent carrying out task who has an idea t(A)
generates value if and only if he has access to all the assets in A. v(A)
This is an important restriction. Although there is no loss of generality
in deﬁning a task by the set of assets needed to generate value, it is
restrictive to limit each agent to one task.
4 We shall return to this point
in Section VIII.
If two people have an idea as to how to use an asset, they cannot both
have their way.
Assumption 3. Only one person can have access to, or use of, an
asset at a time.
This is the source of tension in the model: the asset is a scarce re-
2 The model is easily generalized to have more than one possible task for each subset
of assets A, although this would complicate the notation.
3 More generally,we might assumethatatask alwaysgeneratessomepositivebaseline t(A)
value and that, with probability p(A), an additional value v(A) can be generated. Note
that there must be some subsets A for which v(A) is strictly positive; otherwise the problem
is uninteresting.
4 The model could be extended to allow an agent to undertake more than one task—
perhaps with a concomitant reduction in the probability of his having an idea on each—
but a number of our results would have to be modiﬁed.design of hierarchies 681
source. At the heart of our analysis lies the question, how are conﬂicts
over the use of an asset to be resolved?
We assume that at date 0 an organizational form is put in place that
determines a chain of command for how each asset is to be used at
date 1.
Assumption 4. Access to assets is determined by a hierarchical
structure. That is, each asset ak has a chain of command, a list Lk, that
ranks agents by seniority over that asset.
In principle, there are many nonhierarchical structures that we might
also consider, such as voting rules or the use of mediators to resolve
conﬂicts. But for the moment let us suppose that all such arrangements
are infeasible. This matter is taken up further in Section VII.
People without ideas at date 1 are passive and drop out of the picture.
Assumption 5. On each asset ak, senior agents who do not have an
idea do not exercise authority; they defer to the highest-ranking person
on list Lk who does have an idea.
However, someone with an idea is always active, even if, because of
assumption 2, he is unable to generate any value.
Assumption 6. The most senior person with an idea exercises au-
thority whether or not he has access to the other assets he needs to
generate value. There is no ex post renegotiation of authority at date 1.
Assumption 6, in conjunction with assumptions 2 and 4, is perhaps
the strongest of our assumptions.
5
In contrast to assumption 6, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 7. The assignment of tasks to agents and the hierar-
chical structure are chosen at date 0 to maximize expected value.
We have in mind that at date 0 the parties are able to negotiate, with
the surplus being divided up using lump-sum transfers.
A number of interpretations of the model are offered in Section VII.
We shall maintain all seven assumptions, 1–7, throughout. For most of
the paper we shall make an eighth assumption.
Assumption 8. All agents have an equal ability to undertake any
task.
Assumption 8 implies that in the date 0 assignment of tasks, it does
not matter who does what; it only matters which tasks are undertaken.
As we shall see, this assumption is useful because some—but by no means
all—of our general results depend on the ability to change the com-
position of tasks that are undertaken. The alternative to assumption 8
would be to allow for skill speciﬁcity across agents, and, in the extreme,
task assignment might even be ﬁxed exogenously. In Sections III and
5 An interesting open question is how far our results would be affected by instead
assuming that people exercise authority only if they can generate value; we conjecture
that, in substance, our results would remain intact.682 journal of political economy
IV, we shall ﬁnd it helpful to consider the case of ﬁxed tasks as a pre-
liminary exercise before dealing with the case of endogenous task
assignment.
Before we write down the formula for date 0 expected total value, we
can simplify matters a little. Clearly, there is no point in having anyone
entered more than once on some list Lk, because only the ﬁrst, most
senior, entry would be pertinent. Also, if an agent’s task consists of
looking after assets in the subset A, then it makes no sense to put the
agent on the list Lk pertaining to an asset , since the agent will a  A k
never have an idea about ak. Similarly, it makes no sense not to put him
on the list Lk pertaining to each asset , since by assumption 2 he a  A k
generates no value unless he has access to all the assets in A.
Putting these observations together, we can conclude the following.
Once the lists for all the assets have been determined, the task each
person is doing can be deduced by seeing on which list he appears.
Speciﬁcally, for agent i deﬁne
A p {assets a Fi appears on list L }. ik k
Given that Ai is the maximal set of assets over which i can exercise
authority, he must be engaged in task . t(A ) i
For each agent i, deﬁne
S p {agents jFfor some asset a , i and j both appear on list L ik k
and j appears above i}.
The term Si is the set of agents who are senior to i on some asset. Now
we know from assumptions 2 and 6 that i generates value if and v(A ) i
only if he has an idea and nobody senior to him on any of the assets
he looks after has an idea. We can therefore write the formula for the
date 0 expected total value:
n
V p p(A )[ 1  p(A )] v(A ). (1)  ij i {} jS ip1 i
By assumption 7, an optimal organization form, the mlists, will be chosen
to maximize (1).
III. Two Agents
Let us start with a simple case in which there are just two agents, 1 and
2. As a preliminary exercise, let us ignore the choice of task assignment,
and suppose that they have ﬁxed tasks and , respectively. Given t(A ) t(A ) 12
that their tasks are ﬁxed, the only question is, which agent should be
senior on each of the assets in , the assets they have in A p A ∩ A 12design of hierarchies 683
common? Assume that A is nonempty (if A is empty, authority is not an
issue). Note that seniority matters only in the event that both agents
have an idea, because, by assumption 5, if only one has an idea, the
other will defer irrespective of seniority. Also note that if both agents
have an idea, they cannot both generate surplus because, by assumption
2, they would both require access to the assets in A at the same time,
which is ruled out by assumption 3.
We make two claims about the optimal seniority structure.
Claim 1. It is never optimal to have a crisscross hierarchy in which
1 is senior to 2 on some asset in A and 2 is senior to 1 on another.
With a crisscross hierarchy, if both agents have an idea, then, by
assumption 6, both will exercise authority on the assets on which they
are senior and, by assumption 2, no value will be generated because
they will block each other. As we shall prove later, claim 1 is a general
result, for any number of agents.
6
Our second claim is speciﬁc to the two-agent case.
Claim 2. With two agents, it is optimal for the agent with a higher
value to be senior.
That is, if , then 1 should be senior to 2 on all assets in v(A ) 1 v(A ) 12
A. Because seniority matters only if both agents have an idea, we can
condition on this event. And given that more value is generated by 1,
he should be senior.
From claim 2, it would appear that the probabilities and p(A ) 1
are irrelevant to the choice of hierarchy. But this is no longer p(A ) 2
true once we endogenize the agents’ tasks. If we make assumption 8,
then claim 2 can be reexpressed in terms of probabilities alone, without
reference to values.
Claim 3. With endogenous task assignment, it is never optimal for
an agent with a lower probability of having an idea to be junior.
This seemingly paradoxical claim is easy to demonstrate in the case
of two agents. Suppose, contrary to claim 3, that 2 is junior to 1 in an
optimal hierarchy but has a lower probability of having an idea:
. Then, since it cannot be the case that (oth- p(A ) ! p(A ) v(A ) 1 v(A ) 21 21
erwise, by claim 2, 2 should be senior to 1), 2’s task is strictly dominated
by 1’s. Not only is she less likely to have an idea, but even when she
has an idea she generates no more value. In which case, we can invoke
assumptions 7 and 8 and conclude that 2 should be reassigned 1’s task.
That is, expected total value would increase by having both agents do
task —contrary to our hypothesis that the initial hierarchy is t(A ) 1
optimal.
Most surprisingly (at least to us), it turns out that this curious result—
6 If we had allowed agents to have more than one task (recall the discussion after
assumption 2), then claim 1 would not hold in general (see Sec. VIII).684 journal of political economy
that in an optimal hierarchy agents’ seniorities are inversely related to
their probability of having an idea—is quite general and provides the
key lemma from which all other results follow as corollaries.
Before leaving the two-person hierarchy, we should mention a useful
analogy from tennis (suggested to us by Andrea Prat). A player usually
has two kinds of serves: fast and slow. A fast serve has a lower chance
of success but a higher impact if successful. On each service point, a
player typically chooses to serve fast on his ﬁrst serve and, if that fails,
slow on his second. Sometimes he may choose to serve fast twice, or
slow twice, but never slow then fast. This squares with claim 3: the fast
serve (with the lower chance of success) is never “junior” to the slow
serve.
7
It is straightforward to conﬁrm that, just as with the choice of serves
in tennis, the design of an optimal two-person hierarchy typically has
an “interior” solution; that is, the agents are assigned different tasks,
even though at ﬁrst glance the problem appears inherently linear. The
point is that, for any task , the option value, , assumes importance t(A) v(A)
in the design of an optimal hierarchy.
8 By contrast, in a one-person
problem only the expected value would matter. p(A)v(A)
The case of two agents is too simple to allow us to get at interesting
questions to do with coordination and specialization. We need to turn
to three agents.
IV. Three Agents
Suppose now that there are three agents, 1, 2, and 3, and, for simplicity,
just two symmetric assets, and . This means that there are only two aa 12
kinds of tasks: an agent can be either a specialist, working on one of
the assets, or a coordinator, working on both. Let a specialist have an
idea with probability ps, which generates value vs; and let a coordinator
have an idea with probability pc, which generates value vc.
9
Again, it is instructive, as a preliminary exercise, to ﬁx the agents’
tasks. Suppose that agents 1 and 2 must be specialists, working on assets
and , respectively, and agent 3 must be a coordinator. Given this aa 12
exogenous assignment of tasks, there are really only two possible hi-
erarchies to consider: either the coordinator is senior to the specialist
7 If there were some beneﬁt to winning the point on the ﬁrst serve (e.g., if there were
discounting), then this would not necessarily be true. The analogy with tennis is not exact
because in our model the “ﬁrst serve” (the senior agent) preempts, rather than precedes,
the “second serve” (the junior agent).
8 This point is related to the observation of Roberts and Weitzman (1981) about the
role of option value rather than expected return in determining the optimal sequence
of exploration projects.
9 That is, , and , v({a }) p v({a }) p vp ({a }) p p({a }) p pv ({a , a }) p vp ({a , a }) p 12 s 12 s 12 c 12
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TABLE 1
Hierarchy css
(Coordinator Senior)
Hierarchy ssc
(Coordinator Junior)
Asset a1 Asset a2 Asset a1 Asset a2
33 12
12 33
on each asset or she is junior. Call these hierarchies css and ssc, respec-
tively (see table 1). The third possibility, in which the coordinator is
senior to agent 1 on asset 1 but junior to agent 2 on asset 2, or vice
versa, is never optimal in this symmetric example, so we do not consider
it.
The date 0 expected total values from the two hierarchies are,
respectively,
V(css) p pv  (1  p)2pv (2) cc c ss
and
2 V(ssc) p 2pv  (1  p) pv. (3) ss s cc
The ﬁrst term in the expression for V(css) comes from the fact that if
the coordinator 3 is senior, then she generates expected value . It is pv cc
only when, with probability , she does not have an idea that spe- 1  pc
cialists 1 and 2 can each generate expected value ; hence the second pv ss
term in (2). The ﬁrst term in the expression for V(ssc), by contrast,
comes from the fact that if 1 and 2 are senior, they can together generate
. If either of them has an idea, then, by assumption 2, they block 2pv ss
3 from access to a needed asset. It is only when, with probability (1 
, neither of them has an idea that 3 can generate expected value
2 p) s
; hence the second term in (3). pv cc
From (2) and (3), we have
V(css)  V(ssc)a s( 2  p)v  2v. (4) sc s
At one extreme, if , it is better to make the coordinator senior, v 1 2v cs
irrespective of ps, because the value of her idea is higher than the com-
bined value of the specialists’ ideas. At the other extreme, if , it v 1 v sc
is better to make the specialists senior, irrespective of ps, because the
value of just one of their ideas is higher than that of the coordinator’s
idea. In the middle ground, where , there is a critical value 2v 1 v 1 v scs
of ps: below this value, it is better to make the coordinator senior; above,
it is better to make the specialists senior. The intuition is that seniority
matters only when the coordinator and at least one of the specialists
have an idea. Given , it is better for the coordinator’s idea 2v 1 v 1 v scs686 journal of political economy
TABLE 2
Hierarchy sss
(Three Specialists)
Hierarchy ccc
(Three Coordinators)
Asset a1 Asset a2 Asset a1 Asset a2
12 11
32 2
33
to be implemented if exactly one specialist has an idea and for the
coordinator’s idea not to be implemented if both specialists have ideas.
The former event is relatively likely if ps is low and relatively unlikely if
ps is high.
One lesson to be learned from this is that with three or more agents
the choice of seniority, even with ﬁxed tasks, depends on the probabilities
p as well as on the values v—in contrast to the two-agent case with ﬁxed
tasks, where only the relative values mattered.
10 That is, for three or more
agents, there are no general results equivalent to claim 2.
So far in this section all we have done is to compare the two hierarchies
in table 1, keeping tasks ﬁxed. It is time to allow for an endogenous
assignment of tasks. For the remainder of the paper, we shall assume
that assumption 8 holds.
There are several possible task assignments and hierarchies to con-
sider in addition to those in table 1, but since Section V deals with the
general case, let us for now look at the two extreme hierarchies: hier-
archy sss, comprising three specialists (with two agents specializing on,
say, asset ), and hierarchy ccc, comprising three coordinators (see table a1
2).
11
The date 0 expected total values from these hierarchies are,
respectively,
2 V(sss) p [1  (1  p)] v  pv (5) sss s
and
3 V(ccc) p [1  (1  p)] v. (6) cc
The ﬁrst term in the expression for V(sss) comes from the fact that vs
is realized on asset if either 1 or 3 has an idea. The expression for a1
V(ccc) comes from the fact that vc is realized unless no one has an idea.
10 In a comparison of hierarchies css and ssc, the value of pc is irrelevant because seniority
matters only in the event that the coordinator has an idea. But this pertains to ﬁxed tasks.
As we shall see, when tasks are endogenous, both ps and pc are important in determining
the optimal hierarchy.
11 The cases we have not considered involve two coordinators and one specialist. But
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The following results can be established by simple algebra.
Result 1. Suppose . Then . p ! pV (ssc) ! max[V(css), V(sss)] cs
Result 2. Suppose . Then .
12 p ! pV (css) ! max[V(ssc), V(ccc)] sc
Although we have not considered all possible hierarchies, results 1
and 2 suggest that in an optimal hierarchy an agent with a lower prob-
ability of having an idea is never junior, just as we found in claim 3 for
the case of two agents. For example, in result 1, where the coordinator
has a lower probability of having an idea, it is not optimal to make her
junior to two specialists: hierarchy ssc is dominated by at least one other
hierarchy. The rough intuition is that either vc is high relative to vs or
it is low. If high, then the coordinator’s idea should be implemented if
she has one; that is, hierarchy css dominates hierarchy ssc. If low, then,
given , the coordinator is inferior in every way to a specialist—she p ! p cs
has a smaller probability of having an idea and her idea has smaller
value—and so she should be reassigned as a specialist; that is, hierarchy
sss dominates hierarchy ssc.
13 A broadly similar logic applies in result 2:
either vs is high relative to vc and hierarchy ssc dominates hierarchy css,
or vs is low relative to vc and, given , the two specialists should be p ! p sc
reassigned as coordinators.
In the next section we shall prove that claim 3 is indeed a general
result.
Before we leave the three-agent example, we should discuss the fact
that in a reasonable class of cases it appears to be better to make a
coordinator junior; that is, hierarchy ssc is optimal. There may be in-
teresting situations in which this is what we see in practice. Think of
two ﬁrms engaged in a production or marketing alliance. Agent 3 is
appointed to investigate synergies between the two ﬁrms. If alliance
activities are regarded as less important than the specialist activities of
the two ﬁrms, then 3 is made junior to the bosses of the two ﬁrms,
agents 1 and 2.
Notwithstanding these kinds of situations, it is counterintuitive that
a strategic planner should be low down in the hierarchy. Thus we are
interested in ﬁnding conditions that knock out hierarchy ssc. Of course,
if we are prepared to assume that strategic planners are highly produc-
tive ( ), then we know from (4) that hierarchy ssc is dominated v 1 2v cs
by hierarchy css, irrespective of probabilities. But the assumption that
is quite strong. v 1 2v cs
If, instead, we are prepared to assume that coordinators have a lower
probability of having an idea, then we know from result 1 that hierarchy
12 Let , , and . If , then
     D p V(css)  V(ssc) D p V(sss)  V(ssc) D p V(css)  V(ccc) p ! p cs
, and hence one of D and must be strictly positive. If
   (D/p )  [2D/(1 p)] 1 0 D p ! cs s
, then , and hence one of D and must be strictly negative.
      p (D/p )  [D /(1 p )] ! 0 D cc c
13 This intuition is only rough: the argument is more delicate in the middle ground,
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ssc is not optimal. In our opinion, this should be seen as the leading
case. We think that the monotonicity condition is intuitively rea- p ! p cs
sonable given our interpretation that the coordinator is a strategic plan-
ner. We have in mind that a strategic planner contemplates future di-
rections for the organization. For example, a new direction might be
to change the product line or location or to put more emphasis on
foreign sales rather than on domestic sales. If such a new direction is
found and implemented, then this will have major repercussions for all
the other people working on these assets (formally, it will preclude the
implementation of their ideas). Finding such a new direction is not a
routine matter, however, and this is why the strategic planner’s proba-
bility of having an idea may be low.
V. General Results
In this section we establish some general results about optimal orga-
nization forms. As promised, here is the generalization of claim 3 that
will be the key to all our other results.
Lemma. Consider an optimal hierarchy. If , then for p(A ) ! p(A ) ji
all assets , j appears above i on list Lk. a  A ∩ A ki j
Proof. See the Appendix.
It may help to rehearse why this result is not as odd as it looks! It
seems to suggest that the choice of hierarchy is determined solely by
the probability of success and not at all by the value of an idea. But the
lemma says nothing about which tasks should be undertaken. If a task
has a low probability of success and a low value, no one should be doing
it. In an optimal hierarchy, an agent whose task has a low probability
of success, who according to the lemma should be senior, must be able
to generate a commensurately high value to warrant his doing that task
in the ﬁrst place.
This observation about agents having the wrong task gives the clue
to how the lemma is proved. Take an asset ak, and suppose that agent
i is senior to agent j on list Lk, even though . We show that p(A ) ! p(A ) ji
total expected value can be increased by making one of two changes to
the organizational form. Either i is relatively unproductive ( is v(A ) i
relatively low), in which case expected total value can be increased by
switching i to task and placing him just under j in seniority on all t(A ) j
assets in Aj.O rj is relatively unproductive ( is relatively low), in v(A ) j
which case expected total value can be increased by switching j to task
and placing her just under i in seniority on all assets in Ai.
14 t(A ) i
14 The merit of these two kinds of maneuvers is that one can keep track of how expected
total value changes. By contrast, if we consider a third kind of change to the organizational
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Our next result is a generalization of claim 1.
Proposition 1. In an optimal hierarchy, crisscross arrangements
are never optimal. That is, if j appears above i on list Lk for asset ak,
then there does not exist such that i appears above j on list for
  kL   k
asset .
15 a   k
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that when , proposition 1 follows immediately p(A ) ( p(A ) ij
from the lemma. The heart of the proof, therefore, lies in showing that
crisscross arrangements are also not optimal when . p(A ) p p(A ) ij
Of course, the leading case in which occurs when p(A ) p p(A ) ij
: proposition 1 then says that, given two people with the same A p A ij
task, one should be senior to the other on all the assets they work on.
Our next result, proposition 2, deals with the more interesting case
in which , ; that is, j’s remit is broader than i’s. It gen- A O AA ( A ij ij
eralizes result 1 and makes use of the following monotonicity condition.
Call any task for which a productive task. In an optimal t(A) v(A) 1 0
hierarchy, everyone has a productive task.
16
Monotonicity (M). For any two productive tasks and , t(A) t(B)
, if , then . A ( BA O Bp (A) 1 p(B)
As we argued at the end of Section IV, we believe that condition M
is plausible: the probability of an idea is decreasing in an agent’s span
of control.
Proposition 2. Assume condition M. Consider an optimal hier-
archy. Suppose , . Then, for each asset , j appears A O AA ( Aa  A ij ij k i
above i on list Lk.
Proposition 2 follows directly from the lemma. It says that, under
condition M, it is optimal for someone with a broad remit to be senior
to someone with a narrow remit. However, the proposition covers only
the case in which agents’ remits can be nested. To this extent, it allows
for organizational forms that may appear unusual. Consider the follow-
ing example.
Example.—There are three agents and four assets. No single asset is
productive (i.e., for all i). The only pairs of assets that are v({a }) p 0 i
productive are { , }, { , }, and { , }. Assume aa aa aa v ({a , a }) p 12 34 23 12
i and j, then the people who lie between i and j (on list Lk) are affected in subtle ways
and the impact on expected total value is too messy to be useful.
15 This can be generalized further. It is never optimal to have a “cycle of seniority” in
which, e.g., 1 is somewhere senior to 2 (i.e., 1 appears above 2 on the list for some asset),
2 is somewhere senior to 3, …, is somewhere senior to i, and i is somewhere senior i  1
to 1.
16 If someone had a task for which , he would not be able to generate t(A) v(A) p 0
any value. But such a hierarchy cannot be optimal, because instead he could be given a
productive task and, for each asset , he could be placed at the bottom of list
   t(A) a  A k
Lk so as not to block anyone else. He would then be able to generate value in the event
that he has an idea but no one senior to him does.690 journal of political economy
TABLE 3
Asset a1 Asset a2 Asset a3 Asset a4
1122
33
, and ,
1 v({a , a }) p 16 p({a , a }) p p({a , a }) p v({a , a }) p 20 34 12 34 23 2
. (For all larger sets of assets, , say, but .) p({a , a })  1 v p 32 p  0 23
Note that in this example the monotonicity condition M holds.
Now, it is straightforward to conﬁrm that in this example the arrange-
ment in table 3 is an optimal hierarchy: agent 1 is in charge of assets
and , agent 2 is in charge of assets and , and agent 3 is a aa aa 12 34
subordinate on assets and .
17 What is somewhat unusual about this aa 23
hierarchy is that agent 3 has two bosses: agent 1 on asset and agent a 2
2 on asset . The arrangement in table 3 might be referred to as a a 3
nonpyramidal hierarchy (or, perhaps, as matrix management).
We can rule out nonpyramidal hierarchies if we are prepared to make
a further assumption.
Nestedness (N). Given two productive tasks and (i.e., t(A) t(B)
v(A) and v(B) are both strictly positive), either , , or A O BB O AA ∩
. B p M
In other words, condition N says that if a task is productive, then t(A)
any synergy involving one of the assets in A and a new asset requires
the presence of the other assets in A too. The example does not satisfy
condition N: take and . A p {a , a } B p {a , a } 12 23
Condition N is strong. Note, however, that it is trivially satisﬁed in
the two-asset case.
Proposition 3. Assume conditions M and N. Consider an optimal
hierarchy. If j appears above i on list Lk for some asset ak, then j appears
above i on every list on which i appears. That is, the hierarchy is a
pyramid. Each agent has the same ranking on every asset he works on.
The proof of proposition 3 is direct. In an optimal hierarchy, i and
j must both have productive tasks. It follows from condition N that
, , or . The last is impossible since j appears A O AA O AA ∩ A p M ij ji i j
above i on some asset. If , , the conclusion of proposition A O AA ( A ij ij
3 follows from proposition 2. If , the conclusion follows from A p A ij
17 To see why this hierarchy is optimal, note that the date 0 expected total value equals
21: agents 1 and 2 on average contribute 8 each, and agent 3’s expected contribution is
5, given that he has access to and only if neither 1 nor 2 has an idea (which happens aa 23
with probability one-fourth). If 3 were placed junior to 1 on assets and , his expected aa 12
contribution would be only 4 (he would generate 16 when 1 did not have an idea and
he did, which would happen with probability one-fourth). If 3 were placed senior on assets
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proposition 1. Finally, , , is inconsistent with proposition A O AA ( A ji ji
2 since we know that i does not appear above j on list Lk.
Finally, we present a sufﬁcient condition for a hierarchy to achieve
ﬁrst-best. The condition is a natural generalization of the condition
that we discussed in Section IV. We say that is conditionally v 1 2vv ( 7) cs
superadditive if, for any productive task and any partition
1 t(A) A ∪
of A, . (This is only “con-
2 p 12 p …… A ∪∪ Av (A) ≥ v(A )  v(A )  v(A )
ditionally” superadditive because it applies just to subsets A for which
, i.e., for which the task is productive.) v(A) 1 0 t(A)
Proposition 4. Assume condition N. If is conditionally super- v( 7)
additive, an optimal hierarchy achieves ﬁrst-best.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that proposition 4 does not require the monotonicity condition
M. But the nestedness condition N is needed. Consider again the ex-
ample given prior to table 3, where is conditionally superadditive v( 7)
but condition N does not hold (though condition M does). The ﬁrst-
best is not achieved because in the event that, say, both 1 and 3 have
ideas but 2 does not, it would be better if 3 were senior to 1 on asset
given that 3 could generate 20 whereas 1 can generate only 16. a 2
VI. Centralization versus Decentralization
One of the beneﬁts of our model is that it provides a fairly clear-cut
way of thinking about the terms centralization and decentralization. We
say that an organization is more decentralized if it is more likely that a
decision will be made by someone on the ground, that is, a local expert
or specialist.
Return to the example from Section IV, of two symmetric assets, a1
and , where there are just two tasks, specialization and coordination. a 2
We shall use this example to explore the trade-off between centralized,
decentralized, and independent ﬁrms.
We can make our points most simply by considering the case of four
agents, 1, 2, 3, and 4. (Everything we say generalizes to .) As in n 1 4
Section IV, let ps denote a specialist’s probability of having an idea and
vs its value, and let pc denote a coordinator’s probability of having an
idea and vc its value. Let us further assume monotonicity condition M:
. Then we know from propositions 1 and 2 that coordinators will p ! p cs
be senior to specialists and crisscross arrangements are not optimal.
One can further show that an optimal hierarchy is symmetric: there will
be the same number of specialists working on each asset.
18 In effect,
18 In Hart and Moore (1999), we show that this symmetry result is true for any value of
n: in an optimal hierarchy, there is always an equal number of specialists working on each
asset. (The only exception is the case in which n is odd and there are no coordinators,
in which case the nearly symmetric hierarchy is optimal: one asset has an extra specialist.)692 journal of political economy
TABLE 4
Hierarchy C
(a Centralized Firm)
Hierarchy D
(a Decentralized
Firm)
Hierarchy T
(Two Firms)
Asset a1 Asset a2 Asset a1 Asset a2 Asset a1 Asset a2
11 11 12
22 22 34
33 34
44
then, there are only three candidates for an optimal hierarchy, illus-
trated in table 4.
The ﬁrst two hierarchies, C and D, represent a single ﬁrm since both
assets have the same ultimate boss, agent 1 (who can be interpreted as
the owner of the assets, or possibly as the board of directors). Hierarchy
D can be thought of as a more decentralized ﬁrm than hierarchy C
because authority is more likely to be exercised by a specialist: in hi-
erarchy D, 3 or 4 gets to exercise authority if 1 and 2 do not have ideas.
The third possible hierarchy, T, represents two ﬁrms since assets and a1
have different ultimate bosses: 1 is the boss of and 2 is the boss aa 2 1
of . a 2
The date 0 expected total values for the three hierarchies are,
respectively,
4 V(C) p [1  (1  p)] v, (7) cc
22 V(D) p [1  (1  p)] v  (1  p)2 pv, (8) cc c s s
and
2 V(T) p 2[1  (1  p)] v . (9) ss
It is useful to think of the expressions in (7)–(9) as functions of vc:
is proportional to vc (there are no specialists in hierarchy C,s ovs V(C)
does not appear), is afﬁne in vc with a positive intercept but a V(D)
smaller slope than , and is independent of vc (since there are V(C) V(T)
no coordinators in hierarchy T). Hence, plotting , , and V(C) V(D)
against vc, keeping vs constant, we can get just two possible dia- V(T)
grams, depending on whether the line lies above or below the V(D)
intersection of the and lines (see ﬁg. 1). V(C) V(T)
There is a critical value of pc at which all three lines intersect:
 p* p 1  1  p. (10) cs
The term is a function of ps and lies strictly between zero and ps. p* cdesign of hierarchies 693
Fig. 1
Figure 1a pertains to , and ﬁgure 1b pertains to (our mono- p ! p* p 1 p* cc cc
tonicity assumption is always maintained). p ! p cs
Organizational form is chosen to maximize V, and so only the upper
envelope of the three lines is relevant. If , it follows from ﬁgure p ! p* cc
1a that, for low values of vc (relative to vs), hierarchy T is best; for
moderate values of vc, hierarchy D is best; and for high values of vc,
hierarchy C is best. In contrast, if , it follows from ﬁgure 1b that p 1 p* cc
hierarchy D is never optimal: for low values of vc, hierarchy T is best;
and for high values of vc, hierarchy C is best.
19
The conclusion is that, at least when pc is not too close to ps, a single
centralized ﬁrm, a single decentralized ﬁrm, and two independent ﬁrms
can all be optimal, depending on whether the value from coordination
is high, moderate, or low.
It is worth remarking that although we think that our deﬁnition of
decentralization—that decisions are more likely to be made by a spe-
cialist—is reasonable, it is not standard.
20 It is not uncommon for econ-
omists to deﬁne decentralization in terms of span of control. For ex-
ample, according to Wernerfelt (1992), an organization in which many
workers report to one boss is centralized (this is a ﬂat hierarchy),
whereas an organization in which there is a level of middle managers
between the workers and the boss is decentralized (this is a steep hi-
19 In Hart and Moore (1999), we show that this nonconvexity in the choice of hierarchy
is general for all n. Speciﬁcally, we show that if , where is given in (10), then a p 1 p* p* cc c
single decentralized ﬁrm is never optimal; i.e., there is never an interior solution for the
optimal number of coordinators and specialists. A single decentralized ﬁrm either is dom-
inated by a fully centralized ﬁrm with no specialists (if vc is high enough: is a v ≥ 2v cs
sufﬁcient condition) or is dominated by two ﬁrms with no coordinators. However, if
, a single decentralized ﬁrmis optimalwhenvcliesintheintermediaterangebetween p ! p* cc
2vs and . 2vp*/p sc c
20 A related deﬁnition may be found in Aghion and Tirole (1997).694 journal of political economy
erarchy). We would say, however, that the presence of the middle man-
agers makes the organization more centralized, not less, because the
probability that a worker (specialist) makes a decision is reduced.
Note that we are not saying that one deﬁnition is right and the other
wrong.
21 However, we do feel that it may be useful to have a notion of
decentralization based on the likelihood that local experts make a
decision.
VII. Interpretations and Foundational Issues
In this section we present some interpretations of the model. These
interpretations provide contexts in which it may be reasonable to assume
that decision making is carried out according to a hierarchical structure,
the parties cannot renegotiate at date 1, and yet organizational form is
chosen efﬁciently at date 0. That is, they provide a (limited) justiﬁcation
for focusing on hierarchies—and not considering more general mech-
anisms for decision making.
A. Imagine that the value v(A) from task represents a common t(A)
beneﬁt, earned by all individuals 1, …, n; that is, we are in a “teams”
situation. However, time is very short at date 1 and individuals must act
independently. (In contrast, there is plenty of time to set up the decision-
making process at date 0.) For example, the individuals might represent
the ofﬁcers in an army that is engaged in a war. The assets correspond
to the troops involved in the different battles and the decisions on how
each battle is to be fought. The v’s represent the values from ﬁghting
battles in certain ways. Ofﬁcers may have different ideas about what the
soldiers should do. (Given army discipline, the soldiers will do what they
are told. However, only one decision or plan can be implemented for
each battle.) Suppose that time is so short that not only can the ofﬁcers
not get together to discuss their various ideas (they are in the heat of
battle), but each ofﬁcer does not even know whether other ofﬁcers have
any ideas; he knows only his own idea. Then in equilibrium each ofﬁcer
with an idea will issue an instruction to the soldiers. Clearly the soldiers
require some way to decide between conﬂicting instructions. It is plau-
sible that the mechanism used will be a hierarchy: the troops are told
to obey the general if he issues an instruction; the colonel if he issues
an instruction, but the general does not; and so on.
Assumptions 1–8 are by and large reasonable in this context, and so
our analysis provides a characterization of the optimal organizational
form. Our analysis can explain why the most senior ofﬁcers (generals)
21 There are also other reasonable deﬁnitions of decentralization. For example, one
might say that an organization is decentralized if the authority to make certain decisions
is held by lower levels of the organization, e.g., specialists. On this, see Bolton and De-
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are given the task of overseeing the whole war, whereas a colonel or a
major might be responsible for a particular battle.
B. The “teams” interpretation of the model relies on the assumption
that individuals do not know who else has had an idea (or the value of
this idea); otherwise seniority does not matter since whoever is in au-
thority will defer to the person with the best idea.
22 So consider the
same setup as above, but suppose instead that it is common knowledge
as to who has had an idea and the value of this idea. However, assume
now that v is a private beneﬁt; that is, v accrues entirely to the person
having the idea (if the idea is implemented; if it is not implemented,
there is no value). Then a senior person with an idea will never defer
to a junior person, since the senior person does not beneﬁt from it.
(We must also assume now that an individual with an idea who has
access to some but not all of the assets corresponding to his task still
gets a small beneﬁt.) Suppose that there still is not time at date 1 for
renegotiation with side payments. Then our assumption that decisions
are made hierarchically is plausible. Moreover, if the parties have plenty
of time at date 0 and can make side payments, it is reasonable to suppose
that they will choose organizational form ex ante to maximize expected
value (the Coase theorem). Again the model applies.
C. A different interpretation of the model can be given, based on a
managerial view of the ﬁrm. Assume that the ﬁrm is a public company,
and v(A) is proﬁt accruing to dispersed shareholders. Suppose that
individuals 1, …, n represent managers, who are motivated by power:
to be speciﬁc, assume that each manager gets an ego boost from having
his idea implemented (if he has one) but does not care about money
at all. Then managers will never defer to each other if they have an
idea and no ex post renegotiation will occur (there is no medium of
exchange for compensating managers).
23 Assume ﬁnally that the ﬁrm
is set up by an entrepreneur at date 0 who wishes to sell off his entire
equity stake—representing claims on future proﬁt—for the highest price
(he then retires). Then the entrepreneur will choose hierarchical struc-
ture and task assignment to maximize the expected value of the date 1
proﬁt. (In this interpretation the highest person in the chain of com-
22 This statement ignores some potentially serious computational issues. Figuring out ex
post how to allocate ideas to assets may be very difﬁcult. In fact, Merlone (2003) shows
that, under certain conditions, the problem of achieving the ﬁrst-best in the model of
this paper is “nondeterministic polynomial-time hard”; he interprets a hierarchy as a
particular heuristic to solve this problem.
23 In this interpretation of the model (and in the interpretation in paragraph B), one
might ask whether it is reasonable to suppose that a manager will ever defer to a subor-
dinate; after all, won’t he always have a poor idea that he would prefer to implement?
Assume, however, that there is a cost of implementing an idea and that the manager’s
ego boost (private beneﬁt) varies with the value of the idea. Then, low-value ideas will be
abandoned; i.e., the manager will defer if his idea has a low enough value.696 journal of political economy
mand on an asset represents the board of directors since there are no
active owners.)
D. A view related to that in paragraph C can be given if we are
prepared to adopt a non-Bayesian perspective. Assume that individuals
1, …, n care only about money and v(A) represents a common beneﬁt.
(So we are in a teams situation again.) However, suppose that each
individual who has an idea stubbornly thinks that his idea is the best—
and is impervious to argument. Then individuals will never defer to
each other and no ex post renegotiation will occur. Assume ﬁnally that
the individuals are “sensible” at date 0 and choose organizational form
to maximize expected value, taking into account their future stubborn-
ness. Then the model applies.
Although the above interpretations are all quite tentative or restric-
tive, they do provide some justiﬁcation for the model, in the sense that
they specify conditions under which more elaborate mechanisms than
a hierarchy may be infeasible or very costly. Note that an entirely dif-
ferent kind of justiﬁcation can be given: we have seen that in some cases
a hierarchy can do remarkably well—in fact achieve ﬁrst-best (see prop-
osition 4). Under these conditions, of course, one does not have to
worry about more elaborate mechanisms.
VIII. Further Discussion
We have established several results. First, we have shown that, given the
assumption that the probability of an idea is decreasing in the set of
assets being looked after, individuals with a broad remit, that is, whose
tasks cover a large subset of assets, should appear higher in the chain
of command than those with a narrow remit. In other words, big thinkers
or coordinators should be senior to small thinkers or specialists. Second,
we have shown that “crisscross” hierarchies are never optimal; that is,
if individual i appears above individual j on one asset, j will not appear
above i on another asset. Third, if synergies are nested, the optimal
hierarchy is a pyramid. Fourth, large synergies across assets or decisions
lead to large, centralized ﬁrms, whereas smaller synergies lead to de-
centralized or independent ﬁrms.
It would obviously be desirable to see whether these results are com-
patible with the internal organization of actual ﬁrms. This is a task for
future research, but it is worth noting that our ﬁnding that strategic
planners are placed at the top of an organization does seem descriptive
of reality. Also, our model is consistent with the observation that ﬁrms
are becoming more decentralized over time (see Rajan and Wulf 2003).
It is plausible that the increases in ﬂexibility of modern technology have
reduced the importance of coordination or synergy; that is, in terms of
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model, this would be expected to lead to greater decentralization or to
the creation of independent ﬁrms.
To obtain our results, we have had to make some quite strong as-
sumptions. For example, we had to assume that a coordinator requires
access to all the assets corresponding to his task in order to achieve
value from an idea. We suspect that our results could be generalized to
the case in which someone with a broad remit requires most, but not
all, of the assets under his control to generate value. However, if co-
ordinators always have ideas about small subsets (e.g., about individual
assets), our results do change. In this case coordinators are not really
coordinating; rather, they are multifaceted specialists, doing several tasks
at once. For example, consider the two-asset case and suppose that there
are two individuals, who think about both assets but have ideas about
only one of them: speciﬁcally, individual 1 has an “ ” idea with prob- a1
ability one-half, in which case he generates 100 if he has access to ; a1
and an “ ” idea with probability one-half, in which case he generates a 2
80 if he has access to . The opposite is true for individual 2. Then a a 2
crisscross hierarchy achieves ﬁrst-best: individual 1 should be senior on
and junior on , and vice versa for individual 2. One interpretation aa 12
of this is that each individual has a full-time job and a part-time job: he
is senior in the ﬁrst and junior in the second. Such arrangements are
not uncommon, at least informally. For example, it is not unusual for
someone who is the head of one division of a company to have to get
approval from another division head if he has an idea that encroaches
on the second division head’s territory.
While we make no pretense that our results are entirely general, we
do think that our model captures a signiﬁcant aspect of organizations,
namely, the fact that some people engage in strategic planning and
others in more focused tasks, and it matters where each group is placed
in the organization. Although strategic planners may only occasionally
come up with major ideas, these ideas, when implemented, will nec-
essarily have an impact on most, if not all, of the individuals working
in the organization. In this respect, our assumption that a coordinator
with an idea requires, and crowds out, access to all the assets he is
working on may not be that unreasonable.
We turn now to some ways in which our work could be extended.
First, it is desirable to endogenize the number of assets m and the
number of individuals n; this could be done by supposing that there is
a competitive market and additional workers and assets can be pur-
chased at market prices. It is also interesting to carry out various com-
parative statics exercises. In an earlier version of this paper we analyzed
the two-asset case and considered what happens to the optimal hierarchy
as the number of agents increases. We found that if coordination occurs
at all, it increases (see Hart and Moore 1999, sec. 4, results 2, 3). How-698 journal of political economy
ever, there are other margins of interest. One could ask what happens
as the number of assets or decisions increases along with the number
of agents. Depending on the nature of synergies, expansion might then
take the form of the hiring of further specialists rather than increased
coordination.
Second, it would be useful to incorporate ex ante effort or investment
choices. We have supposed that the probability of having an idea is
exogenous and is independent of effort. In this respect, our model
differs sharply from the “property rights” theory of the ﬁrm (for a sum-
mary, see Hart [1995]). In that literature, it is typically assumed that
the parties can costlessly renegotiate ex post, and the role of organi-
zational form is to provide parties with the right incentive to make ex
ante investments. In this paper we have gone to the other extreme: we
have ruled out ex post renegotiation and ignored ex ante incentives.
In fact, we have taken the view that hierarchy is a substitute for rene-
gotiation. The truth obviously lies somewhere in between.
We end by mentioning two potential applications of the model. The
ﬁrst is to understand how economies differ during periods of national
emergency (“war”) as opposed to periods of normality (“peace”). There
is a sizable literature arguing that centralization becomes more desirable
in time of war, but it has been hard to formalize this idea.
24 Our model
may be relevant here, given that it predicts that centralization is optimal
when coordination beneﬁts are sufﬁciently great.
Second, ever since Chandler’s (1962) work, economists have been
interested in the choice between the U form and the M form.
25 To
understand this choice in our model, consider a stylized automobile
company. Suppose that there are four assets, , , , and , where aaa a 123 4
represents an asset for producing luxury cars, represents an asset aa 1 2
for producing family cars, represents an asset for marketing luxury a 3
cars, and represents an asset for marketing family cars. One way to a 4
structure the automobile company is to combine and in one di- aa 12
vision and and in another division. This corresponds to the U aa 34
form (organization by function). A second way to structure the company
is to combine and in one division and and in another. This aa aa 13 24
corresponds to the M form (organization according to self-contained
units). These two arrangements differ in task design, as well as in design
of hierarchy. It would be interesting to use the model to analyze the
trade-off between the two.
24 For an interesting attempt in this direction, see Bolton and Farrell (1990).
25 For a recent formalization, see Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000). For a discussion of how
the U form and M form compare in their ability to solve coordination problems, see
Argyres (1995).design of hierarchies 699
Appendix
Proofs of the Lemma and Propositions 1 and 4
The proofs of the lemma and of proposition 1 both make use of the following
argument.
Consider an optimal organizational form and two individuals i and j such that
is nonempty. To ease notation, let and . By assump- A ∩ Ap p p(A ) p p p(A ) ij i i j j
tion, and . Deﬁne X as the expected surplus conditional on 0 ! p ! 10 ! p ! 1 ij
neither i nor j having an idea, as the expected surplus conditional on i having Xi
an idea but not j, as the expected surplus conditional on j having an idea Xj
but not i, and as the expected surplus conditional on both i and j having Xij
an idea. That is, the (unconditional) expected surplus equals
V p (1 p)(1 p)Xp(1 p)X (1 p)pXppX . (A1) ij i j i i j j i j i j
Since we are at an optimum, we know that no organizational form can generate
surplus strictly in excess of V.
Now consider four possible changes to the organizational form. Each alter-
native entails changing the seniority/task of either i or j but not both people
together (throughout, we leave everyone else’s tasks and senioritiesunchanged).
These changes will allow us to establish some useful inequalities.
First, lower j’s seniority so that she is at the bottom of every list on which she
appears. If we ignore j’s contribution, then expected surplus is given by (1
. Hence, since V is the maximum surplus that can be obtained, p)XpX ii i
(1 p)XpX ! V.( A 2 ) ii i
The inequality is strictbecause,althoughjisnowextremelyjunior,shesometimes
contributes : when she has an idea and none of the people senior to her v(A ) j
has an idea. (If her task were unproductive, i.e., if were equal to zero, she v(A ) j
could be allocated a productive task instead and still kept junior.)
Second, give j the same task as i and move her immediately below i in seniority
on the lists pertaining to assets Ai, including those assets not in Aj (she no longer
appears on the lists pertaining to those assets in Aj that are not in Ai). The new
expected surplus cannot exceed the maximum:
22 (1 p) X[1 (1 p)] X ≤ V.( A 3 ) ii i
Third and fourth, the changes to the organizational form that led to (A2)
and (A3) can be repeated reversing the roles of i and j:
(1 p)XpX ! V (A4) jj j
and
22 (1 p) X[1 (1 p)] X ≤ V.( A 5 ) jj j
Inequalities (A2)–(A5) will be of use in proving both the lemma and proposi-
tion 1.
Proof of the Lemma
Suppose that the lemma is false. That is, suppose that but there exists p ! p ji
some such that i appears above j on list Lk. Then, conditional on i a  A ∩ A ki j
having an idea, j cannot generate any value because i is senior to j on one of
her assets, ak. That is, i blocks j. Worse, when j also has an idea, not only is she700 journal of political economy
blocked, she in turn may block someone else junior to her from generating any
value. In short, conditional on i having an idea, j’s presence in the organization
serves only to reduce expected surplus:
X ≤ X .( A 6 ) ij i
We now show that (A6) is inconsistent with (A1)–(A5), given that . p ! p ji
From (A1) and (A6),
V ≤ (1 p)(1 p)Xp(1 p)X pX.( A 7 ) ij j i j i i
Combining (A2) and (A7), rearranging, and dividing by , we obtain p(1 p) ji
X ! X .( A 8 ) j
Combining (A4) and (A7), rearranging, and dividing by pi, we obtain
p(X X) ! X X, jj i
which from (A8) implies
X ! X .( A 9 ) i
Taking a convex combination of times (A3) plus (1 p p)/(2 p)( 1  ji j
times (A5), we obtain p)/(2 p) ij
p(1 p)(p p ) j ii i (1 p)(1 p)Xp(1 p)X pX  (X X) ≤ V. (A10) ij j i j i i i 2pj
Combining (A7) and (A10) and dividing by , we obtain p(1 p)/(2 p) ii j
(p p)X ≤ (p p)X, ij i ij
which, since , contradicts (A9). QED p ! p ji
Proof of Proposition 1
As noted in the text, proposition 1 follows immediately from the lemma when
. Hence we need consider only the case , say. p ( pp p p p p ij ij
Suppose that the proposition is false: in an optimal hierarchy, j appears above
i on some list and i appears above j on some other list. Then when both agents
have an idea, they block each other: neither can generate any value. Worse,
they may block someone else junior to them. Hence Xij is bounded above by Xi,
Xj, and X. Without loss of generality, we may assume that . So X ≤ X ji
X ≤ X ≤ X (A11) ij j i
and
X ≤ X. (A12) ij
Combining (A1) and (A3) with , rearranging, and dividing by p, p p p p p ij
we obtain
(1 p)(X X )p(X X ) ≤ 0. ij ii j
This is consistent with (A11) and (A12) only if
X p X p X ≤ X. (A13) ij j idesign of hierarchies 701
Given the equalities in (A13), we conclude from (A1), with , that p p p p p ij
22 (1 p) X[1 (1 p)] X p V. i
But this is consistent with (A2) and only if , which contradicts the p p pX ! X ii
inequality in (A13). QED
Proof of Proposition 4
We shall in fact prove a slightly stronger result than proposition 4. We shall show
that, given any allocation of productive tasks across the n agents (i.e., tasks that
each generate a strictly positive value), a pyramidal hierarchy maximizes value
in all ex post events. The ex ante ﬁrst-best is thus achieved via some pyramidal
hierarchy through the optimal allocation of tasks.
The proof is by induction on n. The proposition holds trivially for . n p 1
Consider agents and any allocation of productive tasks. Select one n ≥ 2
agent—let us call her agent n—whose task is such that there is no one with t(A)
a broader remit (i.e., there is no one whose task is such that strictly ˆˆ t(A) A
includes A). By our nestedness assumption N, the other agents can n1
be partitioned into two sets, J and : in J, everyone has a task such that
  ˆ Jt (A)
; in , everyone has a task such that .
  ˆˆ ˆ A P AJ t (A) A∩ A p M
From the induction hypothesis, in the absence of agent n, a pyramidal hi-
erarchy, , say, comprising the other agents would maximize value in
n1 Hn 1
all ex post events. Construct a larger pyramidal hierarchy, , comprising all n
n H
agents, which is the same as except that agent n is placed in seniority above
n1 H
everyone else on each of the assets in A.
Consider the event in which agent n has an idea: event E, say. In this event,
by the conditional superadditivity of , value is maximized if agent n imple- v( 7)
ments her idea, irrespective of which agents in J (or ) have ideas (agent n’s
  J
implementation of her idea does not interfere with the implementation of ideas
by agents in ). But given that agent n is senior on all the assets in A, hierarchy
  J
thus always maximizes value conditional on E.
n H
Now consider the complementary event in which agent n does not have an
idea: event . Conditioning on has no effect on the values of any of the
   EE
other agents’ ideas. Hence, conditional on , hierarchy always max-
  n n1 EH
imizes value (given that the subhierarchy always maximizes value in the
n1 H
absence of agent n).
In sum, hierarchy maximizes value in all events. QED
n H
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